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On July 6, 2015, Steve Young broke into Homeowner's house through the 
back door and stole items including Homeowner's wife's medication. Salazar and 
his wife met Young for the first time the day of the offense. They drove Young to 
Homeowner's house. Salazar's defense at trial was that he and his wife did not 
know Young intended to commit a burglary. After being stopped by police 
because the car matched the description of a car possibly involved in the 
burglary, Salazar and his wife recounted to law enforcement that at some point, 
Young had exited the car, was gone a few minutes, and then got back into the car 
with some items in his hands. They then drove away. Salazar told police that he 
initially drove faster to avoid a car that appeared to be following them. But, once 
that car disappeared, they stopped at a 7-Eleven for gas.  
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Mrs. Salazar was deceased at the time of the trial. The trial court admitted 
her out-of-court statements to the detective over Salazar's objection. In those 
statements Mrs. Salazar referred to Young as a friend to whom they had given a 
ride. Among other things, she said that she had discarded a bag of pills at the 7-
Eleven that Young had stolen from Homeowner's house. This Court should 
reverse and remand for a new trial because Mrs. Salazar's statements were 
inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause and Utah Rules of Evidence 
prohibiting hearsay.  
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue I: Whether the trial court erred when it admitted evidence of a 
deceased witness's statement to police in violation of the Confrontation Clause. 
Standard of Review: "Whether a defendant's confrontation rights have 
been violated is a question of law, reviewed for correctness." State v. Garrido, 
2013 UT App 245, ¶ 9, 314 P.3d 1014. 
Preservation: This issue is preserved by trial counsel's objection and 
argument in trial. R.440-46,485. 
Issue II: Whether the trial court erred when it admitted hearsay evidence 
under Rule 804(b)(3) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Standard of Review: The standard of review on the admissibility of 
hearsay "often contains a number of rulings, each of which may require a 
different standard of review." State v. Rhinehart, 2006 UT App 517, ¶ 10, 153 
P.3d 830 (quoting State v. Workman, 2005 UT 66, ¶ 10, 122 P.3d 639 (internal 
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quotation omitted)). "Legal questions regarding admissibility are reviewed for 
correctness, and questions of fact are reviewed for clear error." Id. The standard 
of review on the trial court's admissibility ruling is abuse of discretion. Id.  
Preservation: This issue is preserved by trial counsel's objection and 
argument in trial. R.427,433-40. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State’s Case 
On July 6, 2015, Homeowner's house was burgled while no one was home. 
Homeowner received messages from his burglar alarm company and the 
Cottonwood Heights Police saying that his house had been burgled. R.401-02. 
When he came home that afternoon he found his house in disarray. R.402-06. 
The basement door had been forced open. R.402-03,410-11, State's Exh. 7-8. 
There were footprints on the stairs and a scuff mark on the home alarm. R.403. 
Homeowner's sunglasses were missing, along with a money clip, money, his 
wife's medications, some jewelry, and a microcassette recorder. R.403,405-06, 
State's Exh. 3-6,9-11.  
Homeowner testified that his home was on a hill. R.409. The basement was 
accessible from the backyard. R.409-10. Because of the hill, no one in front of the 
home, in the driveway, or in the street would have been able to see what went on 
behind the house. R.410, State's Exh. 1-2. Homeowner did not know Salazar, 
Salazar's wife, or Young. R.407. He had never seen Salazar before. R.408. Crime 
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scene technicians went to Homeowner's house to collect evidence. R.461. There 
was no evidence that Salazar ever entered the house. R.461. 
A witness ("Witness") testified that on July 6, 2015 at around 1:00 p.m. he 
was looking at homes in Cottonwood Heights. R.465. He saw a car driving slowly, 
against the curb, maybe ten miles an hour, go around the area twice. R.466-
68,472-73. He had never seen the car or its occupants before. R.476. Witness 
watched for about fifteen minutes. R.468,473. He never saw anyone get out of the 
car. R.473. The car, a mid-90's Honda, was white with possibly a black car bra on 
the hood. R.466. It had four doors. R.466. The driver had a shaved head, was a 
Hispanic male, and had his seat tilted back. R.469. The front passenger was 
female with dark hair. R.469. Another male, of European, Anglo Saxon descent, 
trotted from between houses and the car sped up to meet him. R.470,473-74. The 
second male jumped into the car and the car sped off. R.470,473-74. Witness 
followed and called police. R.470. Witness thought the car sped up while he 
followed, so he stopped following. R.471,474-75.  
On July 6, 2015, Detective Damien Olson, on duty with the Cottonwood 
Heights Police Department, was dispatched on a report of a residential burglary. 
R.411,413-15. The report said to look for an older 90's, white Honda Accord with 
a black leather bra and three occupants in the car, including possibly a Hispanic 
male driver with a shaved head. R.415-16. Dispatch said that the vehicle was last 
seen at Wasatch Boulevard and 9400 South. R.417.  
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Det. Olson saw a vehicle at 9000 South 1300 East that he believed fit the 
description of the vehicle he was looking for. R.417,452. The car he saw was a 
1990 white Honda Accord with fading white paint and a black leather accessory 
bra, registered to Salazar. R.417-18,452. Det. Olson, in his unmarked patrol 
vehicle, did not notice any speeding or erratic or reckless driving. R.416,452,463. 
He activated signals for the car to pull over. R.452-53. The car pulled into the 
main parking lot at 7900 South 1300 East. R.418,453.  
The car contained three occupants: a possibly Hispanic adult male, a 
female passenger in the front seat, and an adult white male in the back seat. 
R.419. Salazar was the driver. R.419-21. Mrs. Salazar sat in the front passenger 
seat. R.420,449. Young was the backseat passenger. R.420. Salazar was at all 
times cooperative and compliant. R.453,457. Witness came to the parking lot and 
confirmed that the vehicle and the occupants were the same vehicle and 
occupants that he had seen driving earlier. R.420.  
Det. Olson read Miranda warnings to Young and the Salazars. R.421,449. 
He read Salazar the Miranda warnings even though Salazar was not in custody or 
in handcuffs. R.455. Salazar said that he understood his rights and agreed to 
speak to the detective. Salazar told Det. Olson that he had given Young a ride. 
R.456,423. Salazar said that, at one point, Young exited the car, was gone for a 
few minutes, and then returned to the vehicle, carrying some items. R.423-24. As 
they drove away, they observed another vehicle following or chasing them. R.425. 
Salazar drove faster to lose the vehicle. R.425. They stopped for gas at a 7-Eleven. 
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R.425. Det. Olson asked Salazar if he knew what Young did at the home. R.426. 
Salazar said he was unsure but assumed Young had stolen something. R.427. On 
cross examination, Det. Olson said that he did not witness Salazar do anything 
illegal. R.462.  
Mrs. Salazar also agreed to speak to the detective. R.449. She told the 
detective that she and Salazar drove Young, their friend, to an address on the east 
side. R.449-51. She did not know the address because she had been distracted by 
her cell phone. R.449. They then went to a 7-Eleven store. R.449-50. Young gave 
her a bag of prescription pills and asked her to discard them. R.449-50. She 
described the garbage can at the 7-Eleven store where she disposed of the pills. 
R.451. She was nervous because she was on felony probation at the time. R.451. 
She did not know to whom the pills belonged. R.451. Neither Salazar nor Mrs. 
Salazar told Det. Olson that they knew what Young intended to do when they 
brought him to Homeowner's house. R.461-62. Det. Olson allowed Salazar to 
leave but arrested Young and Mrs. Salazar. R.457.  
Det. Olson obtained the surveillance video from the 7-Eleven. R.426,459; 
State's Exh. 1A. The video showed no furtive movements in Salazar's car. R.459. 
Salazar and Mrs. Salazar got out of the car and went into the store. R.459. Then 
Salazar pumped gas. R.460. In the video, Mrs. Salazar, on the passenger side, is 
seen interacting with Young, seated in the backseat, and then going to the trash 
can, away from the gas pump. R.460; State's Exh. 1A. The 7-Eleven was located 
on a busy, noisy street. R.460.  
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Det. Olson believed that Young entered the house alone. R.461.  
The Defense Case 
Young testified for Salazar. R.487-507. He testified that on July 6, 2015, he 
was at his sister's house because he had been kicked out of the place where he 
had been staying. R.487-88,500-01. Young's sister knew Mrs. Salazar. R.488. 
That day, Mrs. Salazar came over to see Young's sister. R.488. Young did not 
know Salazar or Mrs. Salazar until he met them at his sister's. R.502-03. Young 
asked Mrs. Salazar for a ride to the house he was renting so he could get his 
belongings. R.489,503-04. He did not tell anyone that he wanted to go to a house 
and steal. R.491. The Salazars said they could give him a ride but that it had to be 
quick. R.489.  
Young told Salazar where to drive. R.489. Young said "Stop right here, and 
I'll . . . run and get my stuff." R.489. Young did not point out the specific house. 
R.490. He got out of the car, ran around a house, jumped the back fence, ran 
across the backyard, and kicked in the basement door. R.490-91,505. Once in the 
house, Young stole a bag of pills and empty boxes. R.491-92. He took the pills 
because he hoped they were pain pills and he was struggling with a drug 
addiction. R.491-92,501-02. He went back out the back door and out to the front 
of the house, where he ran over to Salazar's car and told him to hurry up. R.492. 
Salazar drove away. R.493. Young thought a truck was following them. R.493. 
Young was concerned that someone was trying to get the property back. R.493-
94. He told the Salazars that there might be somebody in the truck trying to 
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reclaim items that Young had stolen. R.493-94. He said, "I think these guys are 
going to come beat me up because I got my stuff out of the house." R.494,497. He 
said it with some urgency to let Salazar know that he was worried and Salazar 
should not stop. R.494-95. The truck disappeared and Salazar pulled into the 
parking lot of a convenience store. R.495. Young never got out of the car. R.496. 
Salazar went into the store. R.496. Young believed that Mrs. Salazar stayed in the 
car except for when Young asked her to throw the bag of pills in the trash. R.496-
97,505. After Salazar got back to the car, they drove back the way  they had come. 
R.497. Salazar did not demonstrate any concerns about what had happened at the 
house or at the gas station. R.498. When Det. Olson signaled for them to pull 
over, Young thought it was for Young's burglary and theft. R.498-99.  
Young did not remember speaking with Det. Olson although he 
remembered that he talked to an officer. R.504. He didn't remember telling the 
officer that Mrs. Salazar was throwing small boxes from the car as they drove 
away from the truck or that he told Det. Olson that he asked Mrs. Salazar to 
discard the pills at the 7-Eleven. R.505. He testified that he told Det. Olson that 
Salazar had nothing to do with Young's burglary. R.507.  
Defense counsel also re-called Det. Olson. R.508. According to Det. Olson, 
Young initially told Det. Olson that Salazar and Mrs. Salazar had picked up Young 
at a different 7-Eleven. R.509. Young initially lied to the detective. R.457,463-64. 
Det. Olson told Young that Salazar and Mrs. Salazar had told him the truth, that 
they had driven him up to a home. R.509. At that point, Young told Det. Olson 
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that he had gone to Homeowner's home, knocked down the back door, and stolen 
items. R.509.  
Procedural History 
 The State charged Salazar with one count of Burglary, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code § 76-6-202, and one count of Theft, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code § 76-6-404. R.1-2,552. 
 Mrs. Salazar died before trial. R.427-28. At trial1, the State proposed to 
introduce Mrs. Salazar's statements to Det. Olson. R.427. Defense counsel 
objected, arguing that the evidence was inadmissible hearsay and violated the 
Confrontation Clause. R.427-46,485. The trial court overruled counsel's objection 
and ruled that under Rule 804(b)(3) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, Mrs. Salazar's 
statements were admissible because Mrs. Salazar was unavailable and the 
statements were against her interest. R.445-47 (a transcript of parties' arguments 
and the trial court ruling is attached as Addendum A). The trial court also ruled 
that admitting the statements did not violate the Confrontation Clause because 
Salazar could confront Mrs. Salazar's hearsay statements by calling Young as a 
witness or by choosing to testify himself. R.445-46. Det. Olson testified about 
Mrs. Salazar's statements. R.449-62. 
 At the close of the State's case, defense counsel moved for a directed 
verdict, arguing the evidence was insufficient to prove that Salazar had the mens 
                                                 
1 On April 27, 2017, Salazar waived his right to have a preliminary hearing. 
Docket, Case No. 171901573.  
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rea to commit Burglary or theft as a party because all the evidence showed was 
that Salazar gave Young a ride to the location of the crimes. R.477. The trial court 
denied the motion for directed verdict because the jury needed only to find that 
Salazar had the mental state required to commit the offense and that he 
"solicited, requested, commanded, encouraged, or intentionally aided another to 
commit the offense. . . ." R.480. The trial court found that Witness seeing Young 
run to Salazar's car and Salazar driving quickly away and identifying Salazar, plus 
the video evidence and Mrs. Salazar's statement could support a reasonable jury 
concluding that Salazar intentionally aided Young in committing the offenses. 
R.480-83.  
 The jury convicted Salazar as charged. R.552. The trial court sentenced 
Salazar to serve one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison for Burglary, but 
suspended the prison commitment. R.220, Sentence, Judgment, Commitment, 
attached as Addendum B. The trial court sentenced Salazar to serve one hundred 
eighty days in jail for the Theft, granting credit for seven days served. R.221,603-
05. Salazar timely appeals. R.227.  
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT  
This Court should reverse the trial court's ruling on the admissibility of 
Mrs. Salazar's out-of-court statement and remand the case for a new trial. First, 
the trial court should have excluded Mrs. Salazar's statements because they 
violated the Confrontation Clause. Mrs. Salazar's statements to Det. Olson were 
testimonial; therefore Salazar had the constitutional right to confront and cross 
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examine Mrs. Salazar concerning the statement. Where Salazar had no 
opportunity to confront or cross examine Mrs. Salazar, the trial court violated his 
constitutional right of confrontation. Moreover, the error was not harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Second, the trial court should have excluded Mrs. Salazar's statements 
because they were inadmissible. The trial court erred by admitting the statement 
under Rule 804(b)(3) of the Utah Rules of Evidence because the statements were 
hearsay and she did not make the statements against her own interest. This error 
was also harmful.  
ARGUMENT 
I. The trial court erred by admitting Mrs. Salazar's out-of-court 
statement, in violation of Salazar's constitutional right to 
confront his accusers. 
 
The trial court violated Salazar's right to confront and cross-examine a 
witness when it allowed Mrs. Salazar's hearsay statements to substitute for in-
court testimony. “The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause provides that, ‘in 
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to be confronted with 
witnesses against him.’  [The Supreme Court has] held that this bedrock 
procedural guarantee applies to both federal and state prosecutions.”  Crawford 
v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004) (alterations omitted) (Sixth Amendment 
attached as Addendum C).  The Confrontation Clause “bars admission of 
testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was 
unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-
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examination.” Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821 (2006) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).   
This Court should reverse because Mrs. Salazar's statements were 
testimonial and could not be used against Salazar at trial. “Statements are 
nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under 
circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the 
interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.” Id. at 
822. “They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there 
is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation 
is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal 
prosecution.” Id. "Statements taken by police officers in the course of 
interrogations are also testimonial. . . ." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52. 
 In Davis, the U.S. Supreme Court further explained that in Crawford, the 
U.S. Supreme Court considered testimonial all statements that were the product 
of “interrogations solely directed at establishing the facts of a past crime, in order 
to identify (or provide evidence to convict) the perpetrator.” Davis, 547 U.S. at 
826 (explaining Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53). Davis held to be testimonial 
statements that “deliberately recounted, in response to police questioning, how 
potentially criminal past events began and progressed” “some time after the 
events described were over.” Id. at 830. For example, the testimonial statements 
in Davis were from a woman to police officers investigating domestic battery that 
had occurred earlier that day. Id. at 817-20. “Such statements under official 
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interrogation are an obvious substitute for live testimony, because they do 
precisely what a witness does on direct examination; they are inherently 
testimonial.” Id. at 830. 
By contrast, in Salt Lake City v. George, this Court determined that 
certificates concerning breath test calibrations were not testimonial statements. 
2008 UT App 257, ¶¶ 1-2,10-14,189 P.3d 1284. The certificates were 
"uncharacteristic of the typical kind of testimonial evidence at which the 
Confrontation Clause was aimed, i.e., ex parte examination of witnesses intended 
to be used against a particular defendant." Id. ¶ 11. The certificates were 
prepared, as mandated by the Utah Administrative Code, to ensure the continued 
proper functioning of the intoxilyzer machines. Id. ¶ 12. They were not prepared 
in preparation to "prosecut[e] . . . a specific defendant." Id. Thus, they were 
deemed non-testimonial. Id. ¶¶ 12-14. 
 While "exceptions to the hearsay rule" do not generally violate the 
Confrontation Clause, "the right of a defendant to confront an accuser may bar 
evidence that might otherwise be admissible under an exception to the hearsay 
rule." State v. Villareal, 889 P.2d 419, 424 (Utah 1995). In Villareal, a case of 
aggravated kidnapping, rape of a child, and sodomy on a child, officers testified 
as to the content of in-custody statements made by a co-perpetrator. Id. at 423. 
Prior to the officers' testimony, the prosecutor had presented the co-perpetrator 
as a witness, ascertained that the co-perpetrator refused to testify, and then 
"propounded a long series of factual propositions in the form of leading 
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questions" based on the co-perpetrator's confession. Id. at 422-23. "[T]o avoid 
violation of [the defendant's] right to confront his accuser, [the co-perpetrator's] 
statements must have been subject to cross-examination." Id. at 425.   
 Here, the trial court erred because admitting Mrs. Salazar's statement 
violated the Confrontation Clause. First, Mrs. Salazar's statements were 
testimonial. Second, Salazar had no opportunity to cross examine Mrs. Salazar 
concerning her testimonial statements. Finally, the error was prejudicial.  
 First, the trial court violated the Confrontation Clause by admitting Mrs. 
Salazar's testimonial statement. As held in Crawford, Davis, and George, 
statements made to police officers interrogating for evidence of a crime, rather 
than responding to an ongoing emergency, are testimonial. See Crawford, 541 
U.S. at 52-53; Davis, 547 U.S. at 821-22,826,830; George, 2008 UT App 257, ¶ 
11. As in Crawford, Mrs. Salazar's statements were made while she was a 
potential suspect of a reported crime. See Crawford, 541 U.S at 38-39,52,65; 
R.417,420-21,452. Also as in Crawford, Det. Olson's purpose in interrogating 
Mrs. Salazar was to investigate the reported crime. See id.; R.417,420-21,449-52. 
Det. Olson's reading Miranda warnings would have caused Mrs. Salazar to 
"reasonably expect" that her statements would "be used prosecutorially," and that 
they would be "available for use at a later trial." See id. at 52; R.421,449,455-56. 
Unlike in Davis, Det. Olson's questions were not "to enable police assistance to 
meet an ongoing emergency" because Det. Olson did not witness any crimes and 
only stopped the Salazars' car to investigate the reported burglary. R.415-16; see 
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Davis, 547 U.S. at 828; R.462. Thus, Mrs. Salazar's statements to Det. Olson were 
testimonial.  
Second, because Mrs. Salazar's statements were testimonial, Salazar had 
the right to confront and cross examine Mrs. Salazar. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 
59; Davis, 547 U.S. at 821; Villareal, 889 P.2d at 425. Because Salazar had no 
opportunity to cross examine Mrs. Salazar, admission of her statement violated 
the Confrontation Clause. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68; Davis, 547 U.S. at 821; 
Villareal, 889 P.2d at 425; R.427-28. 
 Finally, admission of Mrs. Salazar's statement in violation of the 
Confrontation Clause was prejudicial. "For an error to be reversible, it must be 
harmful." Villareal, 889 P.2d at 425. "Where 'the error in question amounts to a 
violation of a defendant's right of confrontation guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, its harmlessness is to be judged by 
a higher standard, i.e., reversal is required unless the error is harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt." Id. In Villareal, our supreme court considered "the 
importance of the witness' testimony in the prosecutor's case, whether the 
testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence collaborating or 
contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-
examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the 
prosecution's case." Id. at 425-26 (quoting State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200, 205 
(Utah 1987)). In Villareal, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 
because the co-perpetrator simply confirmed another witness and confirmed the 
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defendant's confession. Id. at 426. "[T]he case against [the defendant] was so 
overwhelming that the violations of his right to confront his accuser were 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.   
 Unlike in Villareal, the trial court's error in this case was not harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Consideration of factors set forth in Villareal 
indicates the trial court's error was harmful. See Villareal, 889 P.2d at 425-426. 
Mrs. Salazar's statement was important to the State's case for two reasons. See id. 
at 425-26. First, Mrs. Salazar's calling Young their friend suggested an affiliation 
between Young and the Salazars that was found nowhere else in the record. 
R.449-51,488,502-03. Second, as Young's friend and Salazar's wife, Mrs. 
Salazar's statement that she discarded Homeowner's wife's pills invited the jury 
to base inferences of Salazar's knowledge on Mrs. Salazar's actions. R.427-
28,449-51. As such, the "importance of the [out-of-court statement] in the 
prosecutor's case" was high and was not cumulative. See id. 
Further, other Villareal factors indicate the error was not harmless. See id. 
There was no "cross-examination otherwise permitted" because Mrs. Salazar was 
deceased. See id.; R.427-28. Moreover, the State's "overall" case was not 
overwhelming. See id. The evidence was undisputed that Salazar never entered 
Homeowner's home. R.461. Young testified that not only was Salazar unaware 
that Young had burgled the home but Young provided Salazar a reasonable 
explanation for Witness following them. R.489,493-95,497,507. He reiterated to 
Salazar that he had only taken his own possessions. R.493-95. He testified that he 
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informed law enforcement that Salazar had no involvement in the crimes. R.507. 
Moreover, Det. Olson did not observe Salazar committing any crime, including 
speeding or reckless driving. R.462.  
Finally, in addition to not being harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the 
State's reliance on Mrs. Salazar's statement in its closing arguments indicates 
that the error was not harmless. This Court will reverse a verdict for evidentiary 
error “if the admission of the evidence . . . reasonably” affected “the likelihood of 
a different verdict.” State v. Davis, 2013 UT App 228, ¶ 80, 311 P.3d 538 
(abrogated on other grounds, State v. Ringstad, 2018 UT App 66, ---P.3d.---). In 
Davis, which involved object rape and forcible sodomy, the defendant 
successfully argued that some admitted evidence was irrelevant. Id. ¶¶ 1,64-
65,77-79. However, this Court determined that “any facts the jury could 
reasonably have inferred from the [erroneously admitted evidence] were 
presented to the jury in [] other testimony.” Id. Moreover, the State did not refer 
to the irrelevant evidence in closing. Id. ¶ 83. Admission was therefore harmless. 
Id. ¶¶ 80-84. 
But here, unlike in Davis, the State emphasized Mrs. Salazar's hearsay 
statement in closing arguments. See id. ¶ 83. The State said that Mrs. Salazar said 
that Young "handed her the prescription medication which she discarded," 
linking it to the video evidence from the 7-Eleven store. R.536-38, State's Exh. 
1A. The State again supported its theory that all three individuals, Salazar, Mrs. 
Salazar, and Young, shared the same mens rea when the State argued on rebuttal 
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that the three tried to discard items at the 7-Eleven. R.547. The trial court's 
reference to Mrs. Salazar's statement in denying Salazar's motion for directed 
verdict indicated that the trial court considered her statement as incriminating 
Salazar. R.481. The State's and the trial court's repeated references to the 
statement demonstrate the importance of the statement to the State's case. Thus, 
the error was not harmless and, a fortiori, was not harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  
II. The trial court erred by admitting hearsay evidence in 
violation of Utah Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3). 
The trial court violated Rule 804(b)(3) of the Utah Rules of Evidence when 
it admitted statements from the deceased Mrs. Salazar to Det. Olson. (Rule 
804(b)(3) is attached as Addendum D.) The trial court erred because Mrs. 
Salazar's statements were hearsay and she did not make the statements against 
her own interest. Moreover, the error was harmful because absent the hearsay 
evidence, the jury was reasonably likely to have reached a different result.  
Hearsay is a “statement that [] the declarant does not make while testifying 
at the current trial or hearing; and [] a party offers in evidence to prove the truth 
of the matter asserted in the statement.” Utah R. Evid. 801(c). "Hearsay is not 
admissible except as provided by law or by" the Utah Rules of Evidence. Utah R. 
Evid. 802.      
One exception to the prohibition on hearsay is statements that are made by 
an unavailable declarant that are not in the declarant's interest. Utah R. Evid. 
804(b)(3). A statement against interest is one that "a reasonable person in the 
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declarant's position would have made only if the person believed it to be true 
because, when made, it was so contrary to the declarant's proprietary or 
pecuniary interest . . . or to expose the declarant to civil or criminal liability . . . ." 
Utah R. Evid. 804(b)(3)(A). The statement must also be "supported by 
corroborating circumstances that clearly indicate its trustworthiness, if it is 
offered in a criminal case as one that tends to expose the declarant to criminal 
liability." Utah R. Evid. 804(b)(3)(B).  
Appellate courts "'look to the circumstances under which the statement 
was given'" to determine whether the statement "'is one made against penal 
interest.'" State v. Clopten, 2015 UT 82, ¶ 19, 362 P.3d 1216 (quoting State v. 
Drawn, 791 P.2d 890, 894 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)); see also Williamson v. United 
States, 512 U.S. 594, 603-04 (1994). "The statement need not be an outright 
confession to a crime in order to be sufficiently contrary to the declarant's penal 
interest to be admissible." Clopten, 2015 UT 82, ¶ 19.  
But Rule 804(b)(3) "cover[s] only those" statements "that are individually 
self-inculpatory." Williamson, 512 U.S. at 599 (holding that Rule 804(b)(3) of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence did not make admissible an in-custody statement 
inculpating the declarant and others). "The fact that a person is making a broadly 
self-inculpatory confession does not make more credible the confession's non-
self-inculpatory parts." Id. "Self-exculpatory statements are exactly the ones 
which people are most likely to make even when they are false; and mere 
proximity to other, self-inculpatory, statements does not increase the plausibility 
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of the self-exculpatory statements." Id. at 600. "The fact that a statement is self-
inculpatory does make it more reliable; but the fact that a statement is collateral 
to a self-inculpatory statement says nothing at all about the collateral statement's 
reliability." Id. "We see no reason why collateral statements, even ones that are 
neutral as to interest . . . should be treated any differently from other hearsay 
statements that are generally excluded." Id. "[T]he most faithful reading of Rule 
804(b)(3) is that it does not allow admission of non-self-exculpatory statements, 
even if they are made within a broader narrative that is generally self-
inculpatory." Id. at 600-01. "Thus a statement admitting guilt and implicating 
another person, made while in custody, may well be motivated by a desire to 
curry favor with the authorities and hence fail to qualify as against interest." Id. 
at 601 (quoting Advisory Committee's Notes to Rule 804(b)(3)). "On the other 
hand, the same words spoken under different circumstances, e.g., to an 
acquaintance, would have no difficulty in qualifying . . . ." Id. at 601-02.  
For example, in Williamson, a case about a cocaine shipment, the arrested 
driver's statement that he was transporting the cocaine for the defendant did not 
qualify as sufficiently against the declarant's self-interest for admission. Id. at 
596-97,604. Although the defendant's admission—that he knew the cocaine was 
in his trunk—was self-inculpatory, "other parts of his confession, especially the 
parts that implicated [the defendant], did little to subject [the declarant] himself 
to criminal liability." Id. at 604. "A reasonable person in [the declarant's] position 
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might even think that implicating someone else would decrease his practical 
exposure to criminal liability, at least as far as sentencing goes." Id.  
Similarly, in Clopten, a murder case, the proposed witness's testimony, that 
the declarant was present at the time of the murder and that the defendant was 
not the murderer, was insufficiently against self-interest to be admissible under 
Rule 804(b)(3). See Clopten, 2015 UT 82, ¶¶ 1-2,16-21. In Clopten, someone shot 
the victim; the declarant, the defendant, and two other men escaped in a vehicle. 
Id. ¶¶ 10,20. The declarant's words to other prisoners, "I was there and I can tell 
you for a fact it wasn't him," were somewhat against the declarant's interest 
because he "would have known that the police suspected that one of these four 
individuals murdered [the victim]." Id. ¶¶ 16,20. "Under these circumstances, 
statements exculpating [the defendant] necessarily indicate that one of the three 
[other] occupants of the vehicle was the shooter." Id. ¶ 20. But the declarant 
"never said that he committed the murder." Id. "Although [the declarant's] 
statements have at least some tendency to expose him to criminal liability, this 
does not necessarily mean that his statements have a sufficient tendency to 
expose him to punishment2 that a reasonable person would not utter them if they 
were not true." Id. ¶ 21. Our supreme court found no error in the trial court's 
determination that the declarant's statements had insufficient "tendency to 
expose him to criminal punishment that 'a reasonable person in the declarant's 
                                                 
2 Another motive for the declarant's statement was that the declarant, the 
defendant's cousin, did not want other prisoners to harm the defendant in prison. 
Id. ¶ 21.  
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position would have made [the statements] only if the person believed [them] to 
be true.'" Id. (quoting Rule 804(b)(3)). 
By contrast, in United States v. Smalls, a co-defendant to murder bragged 
to a confidential informant how the co-defendant, the defendant, and others had 
murdered a fellow prisoner. 605 F.3d 765, 769-772 (10th Cir. 2010). The co-
defendant and confidential informant were in a cell together. Id. at 768. The co-
defendant "constantly talked about the murder over a two-month period." Id. 
When the confidential informant expressed concern that someone involved in the 
murder might "flip," the co-defendant explained how there were four men in the 
cell and three participated in killing the fourth man. Id. at 768-72. The co-
defendant said he had suggested the killing and held the victim's hands while the 
defendant held the victim's feet and the other cellmate put a plastic bag over the 
victim's head, suffocating him. Id. at 769,772. Then the co-defendant flushed the 
plastic bag down the toilet. Id. at 771. "But ain't nobody gonna say nothin' I ain't 
gonna worry about that shit . . . That was a clean one right there," said the co-
defendant, explaining how none of the participants could be witnesses without 
confessing their own participation in the murder. Id.  
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that some of the co-defendant's 
statement was admissible. Id. at 783-87. During the conversation, the co-
defendant "most certainly was not seeking to curry favor with authorities in 
recounting the specifics of [the] murder . . . or seeking to shift or spread blame to 
his alleged co-conspirators so as to engender more favorable treatment from 
23 
 
authorities." Id. at 783. The casual conversation "provid[ed] a 'circumstantial 
guarantee' of reliability not found in statements, arrest, custodial or otherwise, 
knowingly made to law enforcement officials." Id. The co-defendant "rather than 
seeking to shift blame repeatedly opined that because all three men were involved 
in [the victim's] murder, none of them could say anything." Id. at 785. While 
some statements were arguably exculpatory, much of the co-defendant's 
statement "plainly [spoke] to a conspiracy to commit murder, an act of murder, 
and a motive for murder." "While [the co-defendant] stated he did not personally 
hold the bag over [the victim's] head or hold down [the victim's] legs . . . [the co-
defendant], as an alleged co-conspirator, was certainly legally responsible for 
those acts." Id. "These comments as to how precisely [the victim's] murder 
occurred are undoubtedly against [the co-defendant's] penal interest and, 
coupled with the circumstances of their making, trustworthy to the extent 
required by Rule 804(b)(3)." Id. "[T]hat makes them sufficiently against [the co-
defendant's] penal interest, rendering them admissible under Rule 804(b)(3)." 
Id. at 785-86 (italics in original).  
Mindful of Williamson, the Tenth Circuit remanded Smalls, directing the 
district court to determine what parts of the co-defendant's statements were 
admissible. Id. at 786-87. First, the district court was to determine what parts of 
the co-defendant's confession were "sufficiently against [the co-defendant's] 
penal interest" to be admissible. Id. "The [district court] should then subject 
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those selected statements not only to [Federal Rules of Evidence] 401 and 402's 
relevancy requirements, but also to Rule 403's balancing test." Id.   
Although this Court reached a different conclusion in Drawn, Drawn 
relied on United States Supreme Court case law which has since been overruled. 
See Drawn, 791 P.2d at 894. In Drawn, a robbery case, the unavailable witnesses 
were women who drove the getaway vehicle. Id. at 891. While under arrest they 
"admitted that they waited in the car while defendant robbed the shoe store." Id. 
They told police "that after the robbery, they momentarily evaded police, let 
defendant out, and threw the money bag and gun out the window." Id. In 
determining whether the women's statements were admissible, this Court said 
"[h]earsay statements of a witness are admissible at trial provided the State can 
show the witness's unavailability and prove that the statement bears adequate 
indicia of reliability." Id. at 893 (relying on Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 
(1980) (abrogated by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004)). "Indeed, in 
the usual case, the State 'must either produce, or demonstrate the unavailability 
of, the declarant whose statement it wishes to use against defendant.'" Id. 
(quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65). Because the women's statements were made 
while in custody, were "substantially similar," other witnesses had observed the 
car, and the statements subjected the women as well as the defendant to 
prosecution, this Court concluded there was no error in admitting the statements. 
Id. at 894.  
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This Court's holding in Drawn is not useful here because the Roberts 
holding, which this Court relied on in Drawn, is no longer good law. Roberts, like 
Drawn, conditioned admissibility of hearsay evidence on whether the evidence 
was within a "firmly rooted hearsay exception" or bore "particularized guarantees 
of trustworthiness." See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66; Drawn, 791 P.2d at 893. The 
Crawford court3 overruled this specific Roberts holding. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 
60-62. "Dispensing with confrontation because testimony is obviously reliable is 
akin to dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty." Id. at 
62. Moreover, unlike this Court in Drawn, the United States Supreme Court did 
not view the unavailable witness's in-custody status as necessarily enhancing 
either reliability or the against-interest quality of the statement. See Drawn, 791 
P.2d at 894; compare with Williamson, 512 U.S. at 600-01.  
Here, Mrs. Salazar's statement was insufficiently self-inculpatory to be 
admissible under Rule 804(b)(3). As in Clopten, Williamson, and Smalls, the 
trial court had a duty to exclude those statements which were not fully self-
inculpatory. See Clopten, 2015 UT 82, ¶¶ 20-21; Williamson, 512 U.S. at 599; 
Smalls, 605 F.3d at 783-87. The trial court erred in admitting Mrs. Salazar's 
conversation with Det. Olson. Cf. Clopten, 2015 UT 82, ¶¶ 20-21; Williamson, 512 
U.S. at 599; Smalls, 605 F.3d at 783-87. Moreover, the error was prejudicial.  
                                                 
3 Additionally, the Tenth Circuit regarded Davis as "render[ing] Roberts 
academic." Smalls, 605 F.2d at 774 (relying on Davis, 547 U.S. at 823-24). 
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As in Clopten, Mrs. Salazar's statement was not a confession. See Clopten, 
2015 UT 82, ¶¶ 20-21. Mrs. Salazar never said that she knew that Young had 
stolen from Homeowner's house. See id.; R.449-51,461-62. Nor did she say she 
knew the pills were stolen. See id.; R.449-51,461-62. She did not say that she 
knew why Young wanted a ride to Homeowner's address. See id., R.449-51,461-
62. Saying that she and Salazar drove Young, their friend, to an address was even 
less of an admission than in Clopten because, unlike in Clopten, she said she did 
not know exactly where they drove Young. Cf. id. ¶¶ 16,20-21; R.449. Also, unlike 
in Clopten, she did not say that she knew what Young did. Cf. id. ¶¶ 16,20-21; 
R.449-51,461-62. As in Clopten, Mrs. Salazar admitted to being in the car when 
someone else committed a crime. See id.; R.449-51,461-62. 
In fact, as in Williamson, many of Mrs. Salazar's statements were self-
exculpatory. See Williamson, 512 U.S. at 600-01. She denied knowing the address 
where she and Salazar dropped off Young. R.449. Moreover, her admission to 
discarding the pills was self-exculpatory. Trial counsel, relying on the State's 
proffer that Det. Olson would testify that Mrs. Salazar knew the pills belonged to 
Homeowner's wife, allowed that Mrs. Salazar's statement about discarding the 
pills could incriminate Mrs. Salazar as obstruction of justice. R.433,438-39. But 
absent evidence4 that Mrs. Salazar knew who owned the pills, her statement that 
                                                 
4 Trial counsel for the State proffered that Det. Olson would testify that Mrs. 
Salazar said she thought that the pills she discarded belonged to the 
Homeowner's wife. R.429. But, Det. Olson's actual testimony was that Mrs. 
Salazar said she did not know whose pills they were. R.451.  
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she discarded the pills was self-exculpatory. Mrs. Salazar, nervous because she 
was on felony probation, likely had a self-exculpatory purpose in telling Det. 
Olson how she discarded the pills because Utah law prohibits possessing 
controlled substances. See id.; see also Utah Code § 58-37-8(2)(a); but see State 
v. Miller, 2008 UT 61, ¶ 24, 193 P.3d 92 (holding that possession of controlled 
substance "excludes temporary possession of a controlled substance for the 
purpose of returning it to its rightful owner"); R.449-51. Her claim not to have 
known who the pills belonged to was similarly self-exculpatory. See id.; R.451. 
Although in Smalls, the Tenth Circuit remanded for the trial court to 
determine if any of the statement at issue was admissible, this Court should not 
similarly remand for that purpose because none of Mrs. Salazar's statements 
were admissible. See Smalls, 605 F.3d at 786-87. None of Mrs. Salazar's 
statements have a sufficient tendency to expose Mrs. Salazar to punishment. See 
Clopten, 2015 UT 82, ¶ 21; cf. Smalls, 605 F.3d at 786-87. As in Clopten, 
admitting to being present in the same car as someone who commits a crime is 
not self-inculpatory. 2015 UT 82, ¶¶ 16,21; R.449-51. Similarly, Mrs. Salazar's 
statement that Young got out of the car and came back, and that they left for the 
7-Eleven store is not an admission that she knew of or intended to participate in 
Young's crime. See id.; R.449-51,460-61. As argued above, that Mrs. Salazar said 
she accepted and discarded the pills is more consistent with self-exculpation than 
self-inculpation. See Williamson, 512 U.S. at 600-01; R.449-51. Moreover, 
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although Det. Olson arrested5 Mrs. Salazar, nothing in the record indicates she 
was prosecuted as a result of her statements. There is nothing in Mrs. Salazar's 
statement that is sufficiently self-inculpatory to make any part admissible under 
Rule 804(b)(3). But if this Court deems otherwise, this Court should remand for 
the trial court to first determine whether any part of Mrs. Salazar's statements 
should have been excluded as non-self-exculpatory and, if so, to hold a new trial. 
See Smalls, 605 F.3d at 786-87. 
The error was prejudicial. "[A]n erroneous decision to admit or exclude 
evidence does not[, however] result in reversible error unless the error is 
harmful." State v. Webster, 2001 UT App 238, ¶ 38, 32 P.3d 976. In, Webster, 
which involved allegations of wrongful appropriation of a car, this Court 
considered whether the prior bad acts evidence and the defendant's wife's 
hearsay admissions to a detective were prejudicial. Id. ¶¶ 1,38-39. Although the 
remaining evidence was sufficient to have convicted the defendant, this Court 
was "not confident that the jury would still have found the defendant guilty." Id. ¶ 
39. Similarly, in State v. Ellis, our supreme court having held that hearsay was 
inadmissible because the declarant was not unavailable, said that "[p]rejudice 
analysis is counterfactual." 2018 UT 2, ¶¶ 24-25,42, 417 P.3d 86. That means 
considering "an alternative universe in which the trial went off without the error." 
                                                 
5 It is common for courts to require those on felony probation to avoid the 
company of persons who are committing crimes or using illegal drugs. Young 
testified that his actions were because of his drug addiction. R.491-92,501-02. 
Det. Olson may have believed that Mrs. Salazar had sufficiently violated her 
probation to merit arrest by being in Young's company.  
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Id. Or, it may mean an alternative hypothetical universe in which the absent 
witness testified in person and was subject to cross examination. Id. n. 2.  
Here, admitting the hearsay was prejudicial. "Without" Mrs. Salazar's 
statement, "the State's case amounted to the following:" Homeowner's house was 
burgled on July 6, 2015. See Webster, 2001 UT App 238, ¶ 39; R.401-06,410-11. 
Witness saw Salazar driving his white Honda slowly, against the curb, going 
around the area twice, with his wife in the car. R.420,465-69,472-73. Young 
trotted from between houses, got into the car, and they drove away quickly both 
from the house and from Witness's truck when Witness tried to follow. R.470-
71,473-74. Det. Olson pulled over Salazar's car. R.416-20,449,452-53,463. Post-
Miranda, Salazar said that he had given Young a ride, that Young had gotten out 
of the car, was gone for a few minutes, and returned to the vehicle, carrying some 
items. R.423-24,456,463. They drove away from Witness because Witness 
appeared to be following them. R.425. They stopped for gas at 7-Eleven, where 
Salazar pumped gas and Mrs. Salazar interacted with Young, and then Mrs. 
Salazar walked away from the car, away from the direction where Salazar was 
pumping gas. R.425,459-60; State's Exh. 1A. Upon getting stopped, Salazar 
assumed that Young must have stolen something. R.427. As argued in Point I, in 
the "alternative universe in which the trial went off without the error," the jury, 
"in these circumstances is reasonably likely to have reached a different verdict." 
See Ellis, 2018 UT 2, ¶ 42. 
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Counterfactually, had Mrs. Salazar been able to testify, the record supports 
that there is a reasonable likelihood that she might have explained her statement 
to deny her own and Salazar's involvement in Young's crime. See id., n. 2. Mrs. 
Salazar might reasonably have been expected to have explained that if she had 
referred to Young as a friend, she meant that he was the brother of her friend. See 
id.; R.449-51,488,502-03. There is a reasonable likelihood that she would have 
clarified that she did not know what Young did outside of the car because he told 
the Salazars that he was retrieving his own possessions and they could not see 
him in the back of the house. See id.; R.409-10,461-62,489,491,503. There is a 
reasonable likelihood that she would have clarified that she did not know who 
owned the pills she discarded because there was no evidence that she ever read 
the labels but simply discarded Young's trash because he was still in the car. See 
id.; R.449-51; State's Exh. 1A. That Mrs. Salazar's statements were admitted 
without Salazar receiving the opportunity to ask Mrs. Salazar for clarification, 
either on cross examination or direct examination, was prejudicial to Salazar's 
case.  
Without Mrs. Salazar's hearsay statements, there is a reasonable likelihood 
that Salazar's trial counsel might have preferred not to present testimony from 
Young. "[O]nce a court has ruled counsel must make the best of the situation." 
State v. Cruz, 2016 UT App 234, ¶ 44, 387 P.3d 618. The trial court suggested 
that Salazar address the hearsay by cross-examining Witness and presenting 
Young as a witness. R.445. Thus, Salazar presented Young's testimony, which was 
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that he had gotten a ride from the Salazars without previously knowing them. 
R.488,502-04. He told them that he needed to recover his belongings from a 
house he was renting. R.498,503. He told Salazar where to drive, and then told 
him to stop and wait while Young got his stuff. R.489. Out of view of the road, 
Young then kicked in the back door of Homeowner's house, stole items including 
medications, and ran back to the car, telling Salazar to hurry away. R.490-
92,505. He explained that Witness was following, intending to hurt Young 
because Young recovered items belonging to Young. R.493-95,497. At the 7-
Eleven, Young asked Mrs. Salazar to discard the baggie of pills. See id.; R.496-
97,505. 
But for Mrs. Salazar's hearsay statements, there is a reasonable likelihood 
that the jury would not have convicted. See Webster, 2001 UT App 238, ¶ 39. 
"[H]ad the jury not been given the additional evidence indicating that" Salazar's 
deceased wife described Young as a friend or that she had agreed to discard pills 
in prescription bottles with Homeowner's wife's name on them, this Court should 
not be "confident that the jury would still have found [Salazar] guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt" of being involved in Young's burglary and theft. See id.; 
R.403,449-51; State's Exh. 11. That is because no witness would have described 
Young as a "friend" of the Salazars. R.488,502-03. Moreover, absent the trial 
court's erroneous ruling, there is a reasonable likelihood that Salazar's counsel 
would not have presented testimony from Young which included Young saying 
that he asked Mrs. Salazar to discard the pills. See Cruz, 2016 UT App 234, ¶ 44; 
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R.439-40,496-97,505. This is especially true where the trial court suggested 
presenting Young as a defense witness to confront the unavailable Mrs. Salazar. 
See id.; R.445. Absent the hearsay evidence in which Young was described as a 
"friend" of the Salazars and in which Mrs. Salazar agreed to discard Homeowner's 
wife's pills, there is a reasonable likelihood of a better outcome for Salazar.  
Moreover, as argued in Point I, infra, the State's reliance on the hearsay 
evidence in closing demonstrated further harm. See Davis, 2013 UT App 228, ¶¶ 
83-84. Mrs. Salazar's hearsay statement allowed the State to argue that Salazar, 
Mrs. Salazar, and Young all shared the same mens rea. R.536-38,547; State's Exh. 
1A. For example, the State argued that Mrs. Salazar "basically indicated, yeah, at 
some point [Young] also handed her some prescription medication which she 
discarded." R.536. The State also discussed the video. R.537. The State argued 
that in the video, where Mrs. Salazar is seen getting out of the car, "she kind of 
walks around and you can't see what's happen[ing] because the gas pump is 
blocking it, but safe to assume there's probably a trash can over there and she 
does something . . . and then at some point then [Salazar and Mrs. Salazar] walk 
in [to the 7-Eleven]." R.537-38. The State argued, from Mrs. Salazar's statements 
matching what was visible in the video, plus photographs from the trash can, 
"[a]nd so did [Salazar] know what was going on? Yes. Did [Mrs. Salazar] know 
what was going on? Yes." R.538. Although the State had the videos and 
photographs, it was Mrs. Salazar's statements that enabled the State to imply an 
affinity and common plan between Young and the Salazars that the exhibits did 
not otherwise portray. Thus, the trial court's error was prejudicial. 
CONCLUSION 
Salazar respectfully asks this Court to reverse the trial court's ruling on 
Mrs. Salazar's out-of-court statement and remand this case for a new trial. 
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ADDENDUM A
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Q. And what did he say?
A. He didn't provide much information regarding it, says
he was kind of unsure but assumed that he had stolen something.
Q. You had a chance to talk to Nikki Salazar as well?  
A. I did.  
Q. And who's Nikki Salazar?
A. Nikki Salazar is Eddie Salazar's wife.
Q. And what did Nikki Salazar tell you?
MR. BAUTISTA:  Objection 802.
MR. TAN:  Your Honor, I believe it's --
THE COURT:  Can you approach?
(Bench conference.) 
THE COURT:  How -- you have a hearsay objection.
MR. TAN:  And I believe --
THE COURT:  What -- what is your offer of proof?
MR. TAN:  As far as it's a hearsay exception, 
under --
THE COURT:  Well, is it hearsay, is the first
question?
MR. TAN:  And I don't believe it is under 801.
THE COURT:  What -- what are you suggesting that he's
going to say?
MR. TAN:  That Nikki Salazar was aware in regards to
what the three of them were doing that day, and that 
Steve Young, one of the coconspirators asked that they actually
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throw some of the evidence away at the 7-Eleven.
THE COURT:  Okay.  And I understand she's dead, right
now?
MR. TAN:  Yes, that's correct.  
THE COURT:  Why don't we take a brief break and let
the -- let the jury go we'll talk more about this.
MR. TAN:  Okay.
(End of bench conference.)
THE COURT:  This is a good time for a break.  We will
take probably about a ten-minute break.  I want to remind
members of the jury to -- to not discuss the case or any issues
related to the case at this time, and certainly to not form any
opinions until you've heard all of the evidence.
THE BAILIFF:  All rise for the jury.
(Jury exits the courtroom.)
THE COURT:  Please be seated.  You can go ahead and
step down.  I'm going to still have a bench conference as to
the offer of proof.
(Bench conference.)
THE COURT:  So, you're saying that -- well, first of
all, Nikki Salazar is dead, correct?
MR. TAN:  As far as we know.
MR. BAUTISTA:  Yes.
THE COURT:  At least we had an obituary?  
MR. BAUTISTA:  Yes, she's passed.
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THE COURT:  So Nikki, you're saying that she's going
to say what?
MR. TAN:  So that they were just driving around, that
Steve exited and returned a few minutes later, they stopped at
7-Eleven and Steve handed her a plastic bag containing some
prescription pills which she discarded, which I believe is one
of the State's exhibits that's been admitted.  And that she
also -- and -- and the -- the last thing is, she thinks that
the pills belonged to the homeowner.
THE COURT:  Okay.  So there hearsay objection.  So
let's go through each of these items.  That they were driving
around.  I assume that's put in for the truth of the matter
asserted?  
MR. TAN:  Correct.  
THE COURT:  That Steve exited for a few minutes
and  -- to the home, and later came back.  I assume that's for
the truth of the matter asserted.  
MR. TAN:  Right.
THE COURT:  And Steve Young asked her to dispose of
the pills.  I assume that's for the truth of the matter
asserted?  
MR. TAN:  Yes.  
THE COURT:  And finally, she thinks the pills belong
to the homeowner.  It's probably a real 701 opinion, but it's
for the truth of the matter asserted; is that correct?
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MR. TAN:  That's correct.
THE COURT:  Okay.  What is the hearsay exception
then?
MR. TAN:  Your Honor, I believe under 801, Subsection
d, No. 2, subsection E, statements that are not hearsay.  A
statement that meets the following conditions is not hearsay,
an opposing party's statement.  The statement is offered again
to the opposing party and was made by the party's
coconspirators during and in furtherance of the conspiracy.
THE COURT:  Okay.
MR. BAUTISTA:  The problem is multi -- no. 1.  I
think they have --
THE COURT:  I'm sorry.  At this point we've -- we've
got the offer of proof, I think we can go ahead and argue it on
the record.  I just didn't want to taint the witness's
testimony.
MR. BAUTISTA:  Oh, okay.
(End of bench conference.)
THE COURT:  Okay.  So the issue the State is arguing
that the statements and the offer of proof were under 801(d)2
subpart E.  Go ahead, Mr. Tan.  So you're arguing that Nikki
Salazar was a coconspirator with the defendant, and it was made
during and in furtherance of the conspiracy?
MR. TAN:  That's correct.
THE COURT:  The question I have is:  If it's an
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admission to a police officer, is it during the conspiracy or
is it in furtherance of the conspiracy?  In other words, it's
-- it appears to be a kind of a confession.  Which is that
during a conspiracy and is it in furtherance of a conspiracy?
MR. TAN:  I believe the content of her statements
itself is during the conspiracy, and also in furtherance,
because the -- and -- and I don't if we need to approach the
bench again, to --
THE COURT:  If you want to approach, let's do it.
(Bench conference.)
MR. TAN:  The part she tells the officer that
Mr. Young told her to discard some of the evidence, I think
that's in furtherance of the conspiracy as well.  So if I can--
THE COURT:  I guess the question I have is:  Normally
801(d)2E is a party -- a coconspirator says something and you
have a witness who hears it.  It's like a party opponent
admission, during the conspiracy being carried out.  For
example, example here might be, if somebody heard her say, "Get
in the car we need to get out of here," while this alleged
incident was taking place when -- once -- once the police
stopped them, the question I have is:  Then are those
statements during a conspiracy and are they in furtherance of
conspiracy?
MR. TAN:  And I think that, as I understand it, I
think it's still part of the -- the furtherance of the
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conspiracy because at this point, she's still part of an
incident where she's still involved in helping out as a
coconspirator.  I -- I don't think that actual crime itself 
has -- when in fact, what we have is one coconspirator telling
another coconspirator to discard some of the evidence, and the
video, I believe, in my argument would be does show that it's
kind of what she did.
THE COURT:  Okay.  Defense argument?
MR. BAUTISTA:  I don't believe that it actually meets
the -- that exception.  And in addition, it would be in
violation of the confrontation clause.  The problem is:  I
believe the Court is correct that it's in furtherance of the
conspiracy would be a situation where someone was in a bank
robbery and Bank Robber A tells Bank Robber B, "Don't forget
the cash," and a witness overhears that, but only Bank Robber
B's at trial.  
Bank robber A's statement comes in because it was in
the conspiracy, it was in the furtherance, or alternatively,
when we have an FBI wiretap or FBI undercover agent, for
example, on a mob sting, I don't believe that it satisfies
that.  Further, if it is a conspiracy, they have -- I think the
State has to show independent evidence to support that
conspiracy prior to the statement being introduced.  
It's the State's theory of the case that there was a
party offense by all people in the car, but absent of these
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statements, they have no -- they have to have independent
witness -- other evidence to corroborate these statements that
in fact there was a conspiracy.  The statements themselves
cannot be used as evidence of the conspiracy.  They -- they are
not self-authenticating.  
Finally, the statement of "Get rid of this property,"
doesn't necessarily showing that she's a conspirator, she's
helping him get rid of evidence, but she did not maintain it
or -- or take possession of it with intent to deprive the owner
of it for herself.  She wasn't stealing it.  She might be
guilty of obstructing justice.  But that would be it.  And so I
don't believe these statements should be allowed.
THE COURT:  Reply?
MR. TAN:  No.  I think what -- as Mr. Bautista
indicated, potentially we're looking at additional charges
because of what she did.  In essence, I'm making an in
furtherance argument because the State potentially can charge
her with obstruction of justice, evidence tampering, based on
that statement.
The other issue though, that I also run into is, for
obvious reasons, the declarant, namely being Nikki Salazar is
no longer available, she's --
THE COURT:  So that gets into a new exception.
If -- why don't we deal with this exception and then if there
are other exceptions, we can decide where that leads us.  Is
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that -- do you have anything else on that?
MR. TAN:  Nothing else.
THE COURT:  Well, the issue is:  These four
statements, and I've just stated on the record that they were
all for the truth of the matter asserted, so it's a -- and 
Nikki Salazar was in the car, the evidence that we have now, is
she's in the car with the defendant and Steve Young, who's
alleged to have gone into the house and broken in and taken
stuff.
And she's making statements about the facts of the
case for the truth of the matter asserted.  And the exception
is an opposing parties statement, a statement offered against
an opposing party and subpart D2E of Rule 801 was made by
parties coconspirator during in furtherance of the conspiracy.  
The key words are "during and in furtherance of."
These statements are made to the police after they were caught
or stopped, and there were separate statements.  And that 
the -- they're not during the conspiracy because at that point
they've been stopped.  Is it in furtherance of the conspiracy?
No, because in a sense it's -- it's an admission of facts that 
may be used against her personally.  It's not further in the
conspiracy.  In a sense it's -- it's creating evidence to
prosecute the conspiracy.
After the -- it has been stopped.  Subpart on -- the
comment under D2E is statements by co-conspiracy -- conspirator
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of a party made during the course and in furtherance of the
conspiracy, admitted as non-hearsay under subdivision D2E have
traditionally been admitted as exceptions to the hearsay rule.
So, and -- and the -- and then the further comment
about the old rule of evidence was broader than this rule, in
that it provided for the admission of statements made while the
party and declarant were participating in a plan to commit a
crime or civil wrong if the statement was relevant to the plan
or its subject matter, and was made while the plan was in
existence, but -- and before it's complete execution or other
termination.  
I mean, I don't know that that directly applies other
than to highlight the fact that it's statements made while the
crime is taking place, the conspiracy is.  So it does not
satisfy the exception under 801(d)2E.  Any other hearsay
exceptions?  
MR. TAN:  We thought the other one would be the
declarant, one of the declarants, that being Nikki Salazar is
no longer available, because she's deceased.  
THE COURT:  Okay.  That goes to 804, what would
the -- the subpart be?  So I'm assuming based upon the -- I
think she's unavailable.
MR. TAN:  That's correct.
THE COURT:  So what is the -- what is the exception?
Under 804.  Do you want to grab your rules?
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MR. TAN:  Yes.
THE COURT:  And why don't we -- 
(End of bench conference.)
THE COURT:  I think we can go -- at this point we can
go on to the overall record.  So I -- the -- there's an
argument under Rule 804 that the witness is unavailable and we
have the obituary of Nikki Salazar.  And I think both sides,
nobody's contending that Nikki Deal Salazar still alive, are
they?
MR. BAUTISTA:  No, Your Honor.
THE COURT:  Both sides agree that they're
unavailable?  Does the State?
MR. TAN:  Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT:  And the defense agree that Nikki D.
Salazar is unavailable, Mr. Bautista?
MR. BAUTISTA:  Yes.  Because of her death.  That is
one of the criteria for being unavailable.
THE COURT:  Okay.  Which is under 084(a)4?
MR. BAUTISTA:  Four.
MR. TAN:  Trying to pull it up, but for whatever
reason the wifi on the internet on my computer is a little bit
slow.
MR. BAUTISTA:  Do you want to come see?
(Conversation between counsel.)
THE COURT:  Mr. Tan.



























   184
MR. TAN:  Yes, I believe we have been able to pull it
up, it is -- I believe it fits under 804 Sub 3, statement
against interest.
THE COURT:  Okay.  Argument on that, Mr. Tan?
MR. TAN:  Yes, Your Honor.  So under Sub A, a
reasonable person in the declarant's position would have made
only if the person believed it be true because when made it was
so contrary to the declarant's proprietary [inaudible]
interests, or had so great a tendency to invalidate the
declarant's claim against someone else or to expose the
declarant to civil or criminal liability.  Again, for the same
facts that we discussed at the bench and I don't want -- unless
--
THE COURT:  We can -- we can -- you can approach and
we can talk about them if you want.
MR. TAN:  Okay.  And again I just don't want --
(Bench conference.)
THE COURT:  That's fine.  You're welcome to put it up
here if that would be helpful to you.  I just think you'll more
likely to be recorded if it's closer.
MR. TAN:  So first thing that she indicated is that
they were just driving around as opposed to anything else in
regards to, like, trying to commit a crime, she basically
states they were just driving around.  She also says that
Mr. Young returned a few minutes later.  Again, about really
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indicating that he's commit any type of crimes.  
At the same time, though, knowing that most likely he
did commit some type of break-in.  And then finally, I think
the most incriminating part is where she says that when they
were at the 7-Eleven, Steve Young handed her a plastic bag
containing some prescription pills, which she discarded, which
I think basically in regards to Sub A, so contrary to
declarant's proprietary and [inaudible] interests.  And I think
also Sub B is supported by corroborating circumstance that
[inaudible] trustworthiness.
I think we have evidence to show that the
prescription pills were found in one of the trash cans at the
7-Eleven, which Detective Olson is about to testify, but has
not testified to yet, so I think it also goes to show his
trustworthiness in that respect.
THE COURT:  Mr. Bautista?
MR. BAUTISTA:  I don't believe that we are just
driving around as a statement against interest, there's nothing
incriminatory with that.  I don't believe saying that Steve
exited the vehicle and returned a few minutes later is -- is a
statement against interest either, and I don't believe those
need any exception.  Their observations or they're -- they're
not of subjecting someone to criminal penalty in and of
themselves.
Stopped at 7-Eleven, and Steve handed her a plastic
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bag containing some orange pills which she discarded.  Coupled
with that she told officers she believed the pills were the
homeowners', might suggest some incriminating statement there.  
The question is:  That's incriminating for her
obstructing, and it's incriminating for Steve, but is that
admissible against Mr. Salazar?
THE COURT:  Okay.  Anything else?
MR. BAUTISTA:  No.
THE COURT:  You know, she is clearly unavailable, I
think both sides have agreed.  I do find it meets the exception
under Rule 804(b)3.  Because I could see her -- if she were
still alive, she's likely going to be prosecuted based on those
statements.  Driving around with a person who went into the 
car -- who went into the house, he goes into a house, exits,
later comes back, and the other evidence that corroborates that
is there are things from this particular owner's house in their
car, including pills with -- that Mr. Combs' wife's name on
them that -- that Steve Young later asked her to dispose of the
pills, she does dispose of the pills, and it's corroborated by
her walking over to a garbage can, at least a video of what
appears to be her walking to a garbage can, and she thought the
pills belonged to the homeowner.  
Well, she apparently had possession of them.  And the
pills themselves that were retrieved, I assume the evidence is
they were retrieved -- retrieved from the trash can, show her
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name on them, and so I see that as being a statement that a
reasonable person in the declarant's position would have made
only if they believed them to be true, because when made, it
was so contrary to their interest as to expose them to criminal
liability, and they supported by corroborating circumstances
that clearly indicated it's trustworthiness, and it is offered
in criminal case as one that tends to expose the declarant to
criminal liability.
All of those facts would be put into a case with the
same type of charges in this case, plus a charge of obstruction
of justice for throwing away the pills.  Plus, it's -- it's
corroborated by both the video of the surveillance camera and
by the statements that the officer said the defendant made in
this case about Steve Young going into a house and coming out.
So I find it meets that exception under 804(b)3A.  
Anything else for the State?  Defense?
MR. TAN:  No.
MR. BAUTISTA:  All of it.
THE COURT:  Yeah, I see all of it, because I --
MR. BAUTISTA:  Because driving around is not
incriminatory.  
THE COURT:  No.  Well, I think it is, when -- when
put with the other facts of the case that they were together in
the car driving around.
MR. BAUTISTA:  How do we overcome confrontation
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clause because he's not -- the State's now using this evidence
by another person against him, without him having a right to
cross-examine that person.  And also I think we have Bruton
issues where we're now having a codefendant's statements
without that individual being subject to cross-examination.  I
think Bruton does not allow this.  
THE COURT:  What's your response to that?
MR. TAN:  I think your argument would be if she was
here, she -- we would be with a subpoena and she would be able
to testify, whether consistently with these statements or
inconsistently, but the fact is:  She's -- she's no longer
here, she's -- she's dead, which I think we all agreed upon,
but it's -- and so I agree.
THE COURT:  Well, I don't we have any evidence of why
she's passed away.  Do we?
MR. TAN:  And my understanding, this is, I think from
what her --
MR. BAUTISTA:  We -- 
MR. TAN:  -- AP&P agent --
MR. BAUTISTA:  I don't think we have evidence; we
just know that she passed away.
THE COURT:  I -- I kind of assume, given her history,
that it was some kind of drug overdose.  That's what I assume,
but I don't know.
MR. BAUTISTA:  I think it's a safe assumption, but
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unfortunately --
THE COURT:  We -- we don't have --
MR. BAUTISTA:  -- the long history of that, could
have been a heart attack.
THE COURT:  Right.  Which could have been one of the
side effects using drugs.  Anything -- so what -- what do you
believe the standard is for the confrontation clause issue?
MR. TAN:  Well, I think if the individual was
available, and either side can have a -- have him or her come
into court and one side or the other doesn't do it, I think we
have a confrontation clause issue.  But when it's clearly the
fact that the person is deceased, it's sort of like similar to
a -- a homicide case kind of, where the victim's dead.  You
obviously, you can't confront someone who's -- you really can't
confront someone who's already dead in the homicide, because
that leads to somewhat argument in regards to this situation
where I think that there isn't any dispute, she's not available
because she's hiding, she refuses to cooperate.  Unfortunately
and sadly she's not available because she's passed away.  
THE COURT:  Response, Mr. Bautista?
MR. BAUTISTA:  I think that confrontation clause,
both for the Utah state and the federal confrontation clause,
trump any rules of evidence.  He has a right to cross-examine
witnesses to test their veracity.  Some of these statements are
corroborated such as the pills being discarded in the trash,
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but the just driving around, and, right now, Steve exited the
vehicle and returned a few minutes later, I mean, I guess
that's corroborated by the defendant's statement, but the just
driving around could be alluded as some kind of criminal
wrongdoing.  We didn't have an opportunity to cross-examine her
and point out, What do you mean by just driving?"  It's -- it's
a vague enough statement that it could be prejudicial to the
defense, and I think without having her to cross-examine, it's
unfortunate that she's passed, but we have the confron -- we
have those clauses for a purpose, so that we can test people
and -- and with her not being here, he's being denied that, and
I do think that without her being here to testify that it's a
Bruton issue as well.
MR. TAN:  And I --
THE COURT:  And what -- talk to me about what you
believe the Bruton standard is --
MR. TAN:  Well, I guess --
THE COURT:  -- and how it applies or doesn't apply in
this case.
MR. TAN:  I don't think it applies, and the other
thing I want to add is:  In regards to the confrontation
clause, I think part of that can remedied by the fact that, as
I understand it, the defense intends on calling Steve Young.
The other -- the third conspirator, and he can either validate
or invalidate some of the statements that is referenced from
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what Nikki Salazar said.  So it's not like she's completely
unavailable.  
And the fact is, again, I would emphasis that she's
unavailable because she's -- she's -- she's dead.  I -- I think
that some of these issues that Mr. Bautista's concerned about
in regards to the confrontation clause, I think some of that
can come in through either the direct or cross-examination of
Steve Young, as far as him handing her the bag of prescription
pills and telling her to discard it.  So I think we -- we're
doing our best to -- to not violate Mr. Salazar's con --
constitution -- or the confrontation clause, when we can't
bring Nikki Salazar back to life and have her testify, but we
do have Steve Young, which the defense has subpoenaed.  Which,
I don't know what their strategy might be, but it might be
to -- to anticipate that this might be an issue, and he can
testify as to whether or not he told Nikki Salazar to discard
the drugs at the scene.
THE COURT:  Reply?  
MR. BAUTISTA:  I don't know if we're allowed to
corroborate the State's theory by the defense witness, that
sounds burden shifting-ish.  But it's -- I don't think the fact
that she's unavailable trumps the confrontation clause.  And
lastly, her statements are incriminating herself and they're
incriminating Mr. Young, but they're -- how are they
incriminating the defendant.  And if they're not incriminating
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the defendant are they relevant.  
THE COURT:  But they're -- he's being charged as a
party to the offense.
MR. BAUTISTA:  They have to show the actual evidence
not just circumstance evidence.
THE COURT:  Okay.  Anything else?
MR. BAUTISTA:  No.  
MR. TAN:  Not from the State.  
THE COURT:  Well, the witness is clearly dead, we've
stipulated to that.  As to each of the items that she's
testifying to, we have -- we have evidence from at least based
upon your opening, you've proffered that he saw the car driving
around.  Mr. Bautista will have a chance to cross-examine that
witness, and that witness is --
MR. TAN:  Musgrove.  
THE COURT:  -- Mr. Musgrove.  If the defendant chose
to testify he could get up and confront that statement and we
also have Steve Young being subpoenaed by the defense.  And
really as to the Steve Young exiting the car and coming back,
the -- in the home, coming back a few minutes later, 
Steve -- the defendant or Steve Young could respond and respond
to that statement.
As to Steve Young heard -- asked her to impose of the
pills, the defendant if he had -- if he chose to testify could
seek to rebut that statement to say he didn't hear it, or Steve
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Young could say, "No, I didn't ever ask her to dispose of the
pills."  As of her disposing of the pills, we have, that
appears to be on the video and that she thinks the pills belong
to the homeowner, they have the homeowner's name on them, and
not Steve Young's name on them.
And so I see in the confrontation issue, we can't
bring the witness back from the dead, but the defense does have
the ability to call the other two witnesses, if it chooses to
confront those statements.
And so based upon satisfying Rule 804(b)3, and based
on the fact that there are other witnesses who could be
confronted about those particular facts, I'm going to overrule
that objection and admit that evidence.  
Why don't we just take about a five-minute recess and
then we'll continue.  Do you want to see if Mr. Musgrove is
here --
MR. TAN:  Yes, I'm going to check right now.  
THE COURT:  And I assume we will start with him and
inform the jury of that.  And is there any objection to taking
Mr. Musgrove out of turn?  I apologize.  Once you start walking
away, I don't think you were recorded, but I made my ruling
that under 804(b)3A and B, there's an exception to the hearsay
rule to allow those statements to come in, and I'm ruling that
the confrontation clause issues raised by the defense, I'm
overruling those for the reasons I just stated on the record.
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And both sides have stipulated to take Mr. Musgrove out of
order, in fact, in the middle of the detective's direct
examination; is that correct?
MR. TAN:  And, Your Honor, either way is fine, I -- I
might defer to Mr. Bautista.  I can talk to Mr. Musgrove.  I
think he just wants to be in and out as soon as possible,
however --
THE COURT:  How long do you think the direct will
take of the detective?
MR. TAN:  I think we're just going to ask the
detective about Nikki's statements and then I would turn the
time over to Mr. Bautista for cross-examination, and I think
we're okay then putting Mr. Musgrove on after the 
detective's--
THE COURT:  That's my preference.  Why don't you go
talk to him, take five minutes and reconvene.
MR. TAN:  Okay.
(Break taken.)
THE COURT:  So are we ready to proceed?  Is
Mr. Musgrove good with finishing this witness before he is
called?
MR. TAN:  Yes, Your Honor, I had a chance to talk to
Mr. Musgrove, I indicated to him that I am almost done with my
direct examination of Detective Olson.  I indicated that the
preference would be to allow defense counsel get a chance to
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THE COURT:  Mr. Tan, do you stipulate to those
changes -- those instructions?
MR. TAN:  Yes, Your Honor, I do.  
THE COURT:  Okay.  So we've essentially finalized the
post-evidence instructions.  So I'll print them out during the
break and court will be in recess.  
MR. BAUTISTA:  And may I have the benefit of the
record in regard --
THE COURT:  Oh, of course.
MR. BAUTISTA:  Your Honor, during our bench
conference and whether -- and the discussions of whether to
introduce Nikki Salazar's hearsay statements.
THE COURT:  Uh-huh.
MR. BAUTISTA:  We -- 
THE COURT:  I want to make clear, we were recorded,
this recorded it during that break.
MR. BAUTISTA:  Right.  I made reference to Crawford
and Bruton, and I sa -- I said summarily, but I believe the
Court was aware that I was making reference to Crawford versus
Washington, which was a case that came out to reemphasize the
emphasis of the confrontation clause and also Bruton versus
United States, which had to deal with codefendant's hearsay
statements being used without the benefit of cross-examination.
THE COURT:  Right.
MR. BAUTISTA:  That's all.
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        1. BURGLARY - 2nd Degree Felony
             Plea: Guilty  - Disposition: 10/30/2017 Guilty                                    
        2. THEFT - Class B Misdemeanor
             Plea: Guilty  - Disposition: 10/30/2017 Guilty                                    
 
        SENTENCE PRISON                                                                        
        Based on the defendant's conviction of BURGLARY a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is 
        sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen 
        years in the Utah State Prison.
        The prison term is suspended.                                                          
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        ______________________________________________________________________________________
 
        
        SENTENCE JAIL                                                                          
                                                                                               
        Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT a Class B Misdemeanor, the defendant is 
        sentenced to a term of 180 day(s)                                                      
        Credit is granted for time served.                                                     
        Credit is granted for 7 day(s) previously served.                                      
 
        SENTENCE JAIL CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE                                              
        To run concurrent.                                                                     
 
        SENTENCE FINE                                                                          
        Charge # 1       Fine: $10000.00
                    Suspended: $10000.00                                                       
        
        Charge # 2       Fine: $1000.00
                    Suspended: $1000.00                                                        
        
                   Total Fine: $11000.00
              Total Suspended: $11000.00
              Total Surcharge: $0
          Total Principal Due: $0
                               Plus Interest                                                   
 
        ORDER OF PROBATION                                                                     
        The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s).                                  
        Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation and Parole.                           
        Defendant to serve 180 day(s) jail.                                                    
        
                                                                                               
        Usual and ordinary conditions required by Adult Probation and Parole.                  
        Violate no laws.                                                                       
        Enter into and successfully complete the CATS Program.                                 
        Enter into and successfully complete the CATS Aftercare Program.                       
        Obtain a substance abuse evaluation and successfully complete any recommended 
        treatment.                                                                             
        Defendant to enter into a DORA assessment and enter into and successfully complete any 
        recommended treatment.                                                                 
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        Defendant is to be screened by AP&P's Treatment and Resource Center (TRC) and complete 
        any recommended programming/treatment as directed.                                     
        Comply with all standard drug and alcohol conditions imposed by probation agency.      
        Do not use, consume, or possess alcohol or illegal drugs; nor associate with any 
        persons using, possessing or consuming alcohol or illegal drugs.                       
        Do not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold or otherwise distributed 
        illegally.                                                                             
        Submit to drug testing.                                                                
        Submit to breath and/or urine testing for drugs or alcohol upon the request of any law 
        enforcement officer.                                                                   
        No spice, ivory wave or items of the nature.                                           
        Submit to random UA's and/or ETG testing.                                              
        Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages.                                           
        Not to possess alcohol nor frequent places where alcohol is the chief item of sale.    
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                           CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION                                         
 
        I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the following people for 
        case 171901573 by the method and on the date specified.                                
                                                   
        EMAIL:  ADC ADC-court1@slco.org                                                        
        EMAIL:  APP UDC-CTServices-Reg3@utah.gov                                               
                                                   
              11/08/2017                  /s/ NAKIA NUUSILA                                    
        Date: ____________________         ______________________________                      
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ADDENDUM C
U.S. Const. amend VI 
 
Amendment VI  
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for 




Utah R. Evid. 804 
 
Rule 804. Exceptions to the Rule Against Hearsay – When the 
Declarant is Unavailable as a Witness 
 
(a)      Criteria for Being Unavailable. A declarant is considered to be unavailable 
as a witness if the declarant: 
 
(1)   is exempted from testifying about the subject matter of the declarant’s 
statement because the court rules that a privilege applies; 
 
 (2)   refuses to testify about the subject matter despite a court order to do so; 
 
 (3)   testifies to not remembering the subject matter; 
 
(4)   cannot be present or testify at the trial or hearing because of death or a then-
existing infirmity, physical illness, or mental illness; or 
 
(5)   is absent from the trial or hearing and the statement’s proponent has not 
been able, by process or other reasonable means, to procure the declarant’s 
attendance. 
 
But this subdivision (a) does not apply if the statement’s proponent procured or 
wrongfully caused the declarant’s unavailability as a witness in order to prevent 
the declarant from attending or testifying. 
 
(b)      The Exceptions. The following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay 
if the declarant is unavailable as a witness: 
 
(1)   Former Testimony. Testimony that: 
 
(A)   was given as a witness at a trial, hearing, or lawful deposition, whether given 
during the current proceeding or a different one; and 
 
(B)   is now offered against a party who had — or, in a civil case, whose 
predecessor in interest had — an opportunity and similar motive to develop it by 
direct, cross-, or redirect examination. 
 
(2)   Statement Under the Belief of Imminent Death. In a civil or criminal case, a 
statement made by the declarant while believing the declarant’s death to be 
imminent, if the judge finds it was made in good faith. 
 
(3)   Statement Against Interest. A statement that: 
 
(A)   a reasonable person in the declarant’s position would have made only if the 
person believed it to be true because, when made, it was so contrary to the 
declarant’s proprietary or pecuniary interest or had so great a tendency to 
invalidate the declarant’s claim against someone else or to expose the declarant 
to civil or criminal liability; and 
 
(B)   is supported by corroborating circumstances that clearly indicate its 
trustworthiness, if it is offered in a criminal case as one that tends to expose the 
declarant to criminal liability. 
 
(4)   Statement of Personal or Family History. A statement about: 
 
(A)   the declarant’s own birth, adoption, legitimacy, ancestry, marriage, divorce, 
relationship by blood or marriage, or similar facts of personal or family history, 
even though the declarant had no way of acquiring personal knowledge about 
that fact; or 
 
(B)   another person concerning any of these facts, as well as death, if the 
declarant was related to the person by blood, adoption, or marriage or was so 
intimately associated with the person’s family that the declarant’s information is 
likely to be accurate. 
 
2011 Advisory Committee Note. – The language of this rule has been amended as 
part of the restyling of the Evidence Rules to make them more easily understood 
and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These 
changes are intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result 
in any ruling on evidence admissibility. 
 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
 
Subdivision (a) is comparable to Rule 63(7), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). Rule 
62(7)[(e)], Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), seems to be encompassed in Rule 
804(a)(5). Subdivision (a)(5) is a modification of the federal rule which permits 
judicial discretion to be applied in determining unavailability of a witness. 
 
Subdivision (b)(1) is comparable to Rule 63(3), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), 
but the former rule is broader to the extent that it did not limit the admission of 
the testimony to a situation where the party to the action had the interest and 
opportunity to develop the testimony. Condas v. Condas, 618 P.2d 491 (Utah 
1980); State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537 (Utah 1981). 
 
Subdivision (b)(2) is comparable to Rule 63(5), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), 
but the former rule was not limited to declarations concerning the cause or 
circumstances of the impending death nor did it limit dying declarations in 
criminal prosecutions to homicide cases. The rule has been modified by making it 
applicable to any civil or criminal proceeding, subject to the qualification that the 
judge finds the statement to have been made in good faith. 
 
Subdivision (b)(3) is comparable to Rule 63(10), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), 
though it does not extend merely to social interests. 
 
Subdivision (b)(4) is similar to Rule 63(24), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). 
 
Subdivision (b)(5) had no counterpart in Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). 
 
